

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
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O 182009Z APR 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2794

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0233

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
SUBJ: MBFR: AHG APPROVED CONTINGENCY Q'S AND A'S FOR END OF
ROUND XIV PRESS CONFERENCE

REF: A) STATE 098017 DTG 172336Z APR 78
B) MBFR VIENNA 0222

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF CONTINGENCY QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS AS AGREED BY THE AD HOC GROUP IN ITS
SESSION THE AFTERNOON OF APRIL 18. OTHER THAN CHANGES
OF AN EDITORIAL OR STYLISTIC NATURE, MOST EDITS REFLECT
THE DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE ALLIES TO BE MORE CIRCUM-
SPECT WITH REGARD TO REVEALING THE CONTENT OF THE
INITIATIVE AND WITH RESPECT TO THE LINKAGE BETWEEN
THE ERW DECISION AND THESE NEGOTIATIONS. CHANGES
OCCUR IN THE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS: 1, I BIS, 2,
3 (BOTH Q AND A DELETED), 9, 10, 13, 14 (ONLY CHANGE IS
DELETION OF "SERIOUSLY AND" FROM LINE 9), 15, 16, 17,
18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 28, 30, 32.

BEGIN TEXT

A. NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE
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1. POSSIBLE SITUATION

PRESIDENT CARTER RECENTLY DEFERRED A DECISION ON PRO-
DUCTION OF THE NEUTRON WARHEAD. SOME HAVE INTERPRETED
THIS ACTION AS A SIGN OF SOFTNESS VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET
UNION AND THE WARSAW PACT. NOW THE WEST IS MAKING

A MOVE WHICH APPARENTLY INVOLVES FURTHER CONCESSIONS TO THE WARSAW PACT POSITION. WON'T THIS MOVE REINFORCE THE IMPRESSION IN THE EAST OF WESTERN SOFTNESS? IS THERE A LINKAGE BETWEEN THE NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE AND THE RECENT U.S. DECISION TO DEFER PRODUCTION OF THE NEUTRON WARHEAD?

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

THE PURPOSE OF NATO'S NEW INITIATIVE IS TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS A SATISFACTORY MBFR AGREEMENT. IT IS INTENDED TO ELICIT A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE FROM THE EAST. THE WESTERN INITIATIVE STANDS ON ITS OWN MERIT AND IS NOT RELATED TO DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

THE ISSUE OF THE ER WARHEAD HAS NOT BEEN AND IS NOT ON OUR AGENDA HERE IN VIENNA. AS YOU KNOW FROM OFFICIAL STATEMENTS RECENTLY MADE BY VARIOUS WESTERN AUTHORITIES, THE QUESTION AS TO HOW THIS ISSUE IS TO BE HANDLED IN THE ARMS CONTROL CONTEXT, IS A MATTER FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY GOVERNMENTS AND CONSULTATION WITHIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. AS HAS ALSO BEEN POINTED OUT, FURTHER ACTION WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SU SHOWED RESTRAINT IN ITS ARMS PROGRAMS AND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS WHICH AFFECT NATO SECURITY. THESE TALKS ARE ONE OF THE
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AREAS IN WHICH SUCH RESTRAINT COULD BE SHOWN. IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR ME HERE TO COMMENT FURTHER ON THIS SUBJECT.

1 BIS POSSIBLE QUESTION

IS IT NOT TRUE THAT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ARE A LOGICAL PLACE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO DISPLAY THE RESTRAINT IN MILITARY ACTIVITIES PRESIDENT CARTER INDICATED HE WOULD BE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT IN MAKING AN ULTIMATE DECISION ON THE NEUTRON WEAPON?

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

SEE ANSWER TO Q. 1.

2. Q. DOESN'T THIS MEAN THEN THAT THE WEST IS THE ONLY SIDE MAKING CONCESSIONS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS? THE EAST HAS NOT CHANGED ITS PROPOSAL FOR THE OUTCOME SINCE THE START OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE WEST AUGMENTED ITS ORIGINAL PROPOSALS AND OFFERED TO TAKE ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS WITHOUT ASKING MORE OF THE

EAST IN DECEMBER 1975, AND NOW THERE IS ANOTHER INITIATIVE MODIFICATION OF THE WESTERN POSITION, WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN NO MODIFICATIONS IN THE EASTERN POSITION?

A. YOU ARE RIGHT IN SAYING THAT THE WEST HAS NOW TAKEN TWO MAJOR INITIATIVES IN THE WEST'S EFFORTS TO MOVE THESE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. IT IS NOW UP TO THE EAST TO SHOW SIMILAR WILLINGNESS TO MEET THE CONCERNS OF THE WEST.

3. QUESTION AND ANSWER DELETED.

4. Q. TODAY'S PLENARY STATEMENT WITH THE NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE WAS DELIVERED BY THE FRG REP. IN THE
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PAST, THE END-OF-ROUND PLENARIES HAVE BEEN DELIVERED BY THE US REP. IS IT RELATED TO THE FACT THAT THE WEST TABLED A NEW INITIATIVE TODAY?

A. THE WESTERN POSITION IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS ALWAYS AGREED TO WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND NO PARTICULAR NATIONAL LABEL IS ATTACHED TO IT. EACH

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2795

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WESTERN PLENARY SPEAKER SPEAKS FOR THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE.

5. Q. IS THIS A GERMAN INITIATIVE?

A. THE INITIATIVE PRESENTED TODAY IS AN INITIATIVE OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. IT IS, OF COURSE, WELL KNOWN THAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT WAS THE FIRST TO RAISE THE CONCEPT OF TAKING A NEW INITIATIVE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WHEN HE TOOK IT UP WITH PRESIDENT CARTER IN WASHINGTON LAST JULY.

6. Q. CAN YOU GIVE US FURTHER DETAILS ON THE CONTENT OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS?

A. GIVEN THE RULES OF CONFIDENTIALITY WHICH GOVERN THESE TALKS, ALL WE CAN SAY NOW IS CONTAINED IN MY STATEMENT.

7. Q. DOES YOUR MOVE ON PHASE I COMMITMENTS MEAN YOU HAVE MODIFIED YOUR POSITION ON THE COLLECTIVE CEILING?

A. NO, IT DOES NOT.

8. Q. HAVE YOU CHANGED THE NATURE OF THE OVERALL MANPOWER
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REDUCTIONS YOU ARE ASKING FROM THE EAST?

A. NO, WE WANT THEM TO REDUCE FROM THEIR PRESENT LEVEL, THAT IS, THEIR LEVEL AS OF A SPECIFIED DATE, TO THE COMMON CEILING.

9. Q. ARE THESE NEW WESTERN REDUCTION COMMITMENTS INDIVIDUAL ONES?

A. NO COMMENT. OR SEE ANSWER TO Q. 6.

10. Q. WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REDUCTION OF A COMPLETE SOVIET TANK ARMY AND YOUR PRESENT PROPOSAL?

A. NO COMMENT. OR SEE ANSWER TO Q. Y.

11. Q. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE NATO COUNCIL APPROVED THIS INITIATIVE LAST DECEMBER. WHY WAS IT PRESENTED ONLY NOW?

A. WE NEEDED TO HAVE SOME PROGRESS IN THE DATA DISCUSSION BEFORE PRESENTING OUR NEW PROPOSAL BECAUSE DATA IS A NECESSARY PREREQUISITE FOR ANY REDUCTION AGREEMENT. A FURTHER DATA EXCHANGE HAS TAKEN PLACE AND SO WE HAVE NOW PRESENTED OUR PROPOSALS WHILE EFFORTS CONTINUE TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF THE LARGE

DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN FIGURES FOR
EASTERN MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA.

12. Q. THE WESTERN DECISION TO PRESENT THE NEW INITIATIVE
WAS LINKED TO THE STATUS OF THE DATA DISCUSSION.
WHAT IS THERE ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE DATA DISCUSSION
THAT LED THE WEST TO TABLE THE INITIATIVE AT THIS

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TIME?

A. THE MAIN FACTORS WHICH LED THE WEST TO DECIDE THIS
IS AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO PRESENT THE NEW INITIATIVE
WERE CITED IN MY OPENING STATEMENT. THE FACT THAT
ADDITIONAL DATA HAS BEEN EXCHANGED IS ALSO RELEVANT.

13. Q. IF THE NEW WESTERN MOVE REGARDING SOVIET WITHDRAWALS
IS SO SIGNIFICANT, DOESN'T IT DIMINISH WESTERN
SECURITY?

A. THE PARTICIPATING ALLIES HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THIS
QUESTION, AND HAVE CONCLUDED THAT SECURITY IN EUROPE
WOULD IN FACT BE STRENGTHENED BY AN AGREEMENT ON THE
BASIS OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES.

14. Q. MEMBERS OF THE PRESS INDICATE THAT EASTERN REPRE-
SENTATIVES ARE ATTEMPTING TO PLAY DOWN THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE BY STATING THAT IT
FAILS TO ADDRESS A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT EASTERN CONCERNS,
INCLUDING THE MOST IMPORTANT.

A. WE DO NOT THINK IT CONSTRUCTIVE OF THE EAST TO
COMPLAIN THAT THE NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE ALLEGEDLY
FAILS TO MEET SPECIFIC CONCERNS. THE FACT IS THAT
THE WESTERN MOVE DEALS COMPREHENSIVELY WITH MAJOR
POINTS ON WHICH THE EAST HAS PLACED STRONG EMPHASIS
OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS. TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE
WEST'S MOVE OF DECEMBER 1975, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE
WEST HAS MADE A CONSISTENT EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE
CONSTRUCTIVELY TOWARDS A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREE-
MENT. UNFORTUNATELY THE EAST HAS SO FAR FAILED TO
DEAL CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH ANY OF THE MAJOR WESTERN
CONCERNS. THE WEST HAD MADE THESE CONCERNS ABSO-
UTELY CLEAR TO THE EAST. WHAT IS NOW NEEDED IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS IS A GENUINE EASTERN MOVE TO TAKE THEM

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ADEQUATELY INTO ACCOUNT IN THEIR PROPOSALS.

B. NEUTRON - CRUISE

15. Q. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE NEUTRON BOMB CONTROVERSY
IN THE NEGOTIATIONS?

A. SEE ANSWER TO Q. 1.

16. Q. WHAT IS THE VALUE OF THE WESTERN OFFER TO REDUCE

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AND LIMIT US NUCLEAR WARHEADS? IF MANY OF THESE
ARE OBSOLETE, CAN YOU STILL RESERVE THE RIGHT TO
INTRODUCE NEW WARHEADS, WHICH MAY BE EVEN MORE LETHAL?

A. SEE ANSWER TO Q. 1.

17. Q. THE EAST HAS URGED THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOT TRY TO
USE THE NEUTRON WEAPON AS A "TRUMP CARD" IN THESE
NEGOTIATIONS. WHAT HAS BEEN THE WESTERN REACTION
TO THAT STATEMENT?

A. SEE ANSWER TO Q. 1.

18. Q. COULDN'T THE WEST USE THE NEUTRON WARHEAD AS SOME
SORT OF BARGAINING CHIP IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS? FOR
EXAMPLE, IT HAS BEEN WIDELY REPORTED THAT A TRADE
OFF CAN BE MADE BETWEEN SOVIET TANKS AND THE NEUTRON
WARHEADS. COMMENT?

A. SEE ANSWER TO Q. 1.

19. Q. ISN'T IT INEVITABLE THAT THE NEUTRON WARHEAD WILL
EVENTUALLY BECOME A PART OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF
THESE NEGOTIATIONS?

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A. SEE ANSWER TO Q. 1.

20. Q. PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECISION TO DEFER A DECISION ON
PRODUCTION OF NEUTRON POINTS OUT THAT HIS ULTIMATE
DECISION QUOTE WILL BE INFLUENCED BY THE DEGREE TO
WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS RESTRAINT IN ITS CON-
VENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMS PROGRAMS AND FORCE
DEPLOYMENTS AFFECTING THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED
STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE UNQUOTE. IT WOULD SEEM
LOGICAL TO CONCLUDE THAT HE IS REFERRING, BY IMPLI-
CATION, TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT HE IS IMPLYING
A THREAT TO PRODUCE AND DEPLOY THE WARHEAD IF NO
PROGRESS IS MADE HERE.

A. THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF.

21. Q. WHAT IMPACT HAS THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE NEUTRON
WARHEAD HAD IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN
THE LIGHT OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S DECISION?

A. SEE ANSWER TO Q. 1.

22. Q. WHAT HAS BEEN THE IMPACT OF THE CRUISE MISSILE ON
THESE NEGOTIATIONS?

A. THE CRUISE MISSILE HAS NOT BEEN BROUGHT UP BY
EITHER SIDE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS UNDER
DISCUSSION IN THE SALT TALKS.

23. Q. ISN'T CRUISE A WEAPON YOU SHOULD HAVE SOME AGREEMENT
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST ON IN VIEW OF ITS MILITARY
SIGNIFICANCE IN THE AREA IN WHICH YOU ARE SEEKING

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REDUCTIONS?

A. THE WEST'S DECEMBER 1975 PROPOSALS DEFINE THE

ARMAMENTS THE WEST IS PREPARED TO REDUCE AND LIMIT.
IN OUR VIEW, THE EAST HAS NOT PROVIDED AN ADEQUATE
RESPONSE TO THESE PROPOSALS.

24. Q. COULD YOU GIVE US ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARD-
ING THE STATUS OF THE DATA DISCUSSIONS AND WHERE
THEY MIGHT COME OUT?

A. AS YOU KNOW, ADDITIONAL DATA WERE EXCHANGED WITHIN
THE PAST MONTH AND THE ANALYSIS OF THEM IN THE WEST
AND THE EAST-WEST DISCUSSION OF THEM HERE IS STILL
IN PROGRESS. THE DISCUSSIONS HERE HAVE JUST STARTED
AND WILL CONTINUE IN THE NEXT ROUND. IT IS TOO EARLY
TO DRAW ANY CONCLUSIONS NOW.

25. Q. WHEN WILL THE WESTERN ANALYSIS BE COMPLETED AND
WHEN WILL THE DISCUSSION OF DATA HERE IN VIENNA BE
BROUGHT TO A CONCLUSION?

A. THE WEST DOES NOT HAVE ANY DEADLINE FOR COMPLETING
EITHER THE ANALYSIS OR THE DISCUSSION OF THE DATA
HERE. WE DO, OF COURSE, FEEL THAT IT SHOULD PRO-
CEED AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE SINCE AGREED DATA
ARE REQUIRED FOR ANY AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS AND
LIMITATIONS.

26. Q. ARE THERE ANY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE OVERALL TOTALS
OF THE GLOBAL DATA TABLED BY BOTH SIDES IN 1976 AND
THE TOTALS OF THE DISAGGREGATED DATA EXCHANGED LAST
MONTH?

A. NO. THE TOTALS OF THE GLOBAL FIGURES EXCHANGED
EARLIER AND THE ADDITIONAL DATA RECENTLY EXCHANGED
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ARE THE SAME.

27. Q. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE DISAGGREGATION? DOES IT
INCLUDE GLOBAL FIGURES AND SEPARATE GROUND AND AIR
FORCE FIGURES?

A. WE HAVE EXCHANGED ADDITIONAL DISAGGREGATED DATA ON
GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER. IT WOULD BE INAPPRO-

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PRIATE TO GO INTO THE DETAILS OF THE DISAGGREGATION
FORMULA IN VIEW OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

28. Q. DOES THE WEST EXPECT THAT THE DATA DISCUSSION WILL
YIELD THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY AND THAT THE
DISPARITY IN EXCESS OF 150,000 MEN ALLEGED BY THE
WEST WILL BE EXPLAINED AWAY OR DISAPPEAR?

A. THE DATA DISCUSSIONS ARE DEVOTED TO SEEKING THE
SOURCES OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EASTERN AND
WESTERN FIGURES ON EASTERN MANPOWER. WE DO NOT
EXPECT THE DISPARITY "TO DISAPPEAR," AS YOU PHRASED
IT, SINCE IT IS A FACT.

29. Q. WHY DOES THE WEST NOT ACCEPT THE OFFICIAL DATA
TABLED BY THE EAST, SINCE THE EAST SHOULD KNOW
ITS MANPOWER STRENGTHS BEST?

A. THERE IS A MAJOR DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EASTERN AND
WESTERN FIGURES ON EASTERN MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF
REDUCTIONS. THE WEST HAS EXTENSIVE INFORMATION ON
THIS SUBJECT AND THE EASTERN FIGURES, AS PRESENTED
HERE, DIFFER WIDELY FROM OURS.

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30. Q. EASTERN REPORTER ASKS WHY THE WEST HAS NOT RESPONDED
TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION REGARDING
AVERAGE MANNING LEVELS.

A. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL REGARDING THE EXCHANGE OF

INFORMATION CONCERNING AVERAGE MANNING LEVELS IS UNDER STUDY.

31. Q. EASTERN SPOKESMAN ALLEGES THAT THE EXCHANGE OF ADDITIONAL DATA WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY THE EAST'S OCTOBER 25 PROPOSALS.

A. BOTH SIDES MADE SUGGESTIONS AS TO THE CATEGORIES OF NUMBERS WHICH MIGHT BE EXCHANGED. WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS WORTHWHILE TO ARGUE ABOUT WHICH SIDE DESERVES THE MOST CREDIT FOR THIS DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

D. INCREASES/MODERNIZATION

32. Q. EASTERN SPOKESMAN MAKES EXTENSIVE AND POLEMICAL CHARGES ABOUT WESTERN FORCE INCREASES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS AND WESTERN SPOKESMAN IS ASKED TO COMMENT.

A. MATERIAL TO BE DRAWN ON AS APPROPRIATE

THERE IS NOTHING NEW IN THESE CHARGES. LET ME POINT OUT THAT WESTERN MILITARY PLANNING AND MODIFICATION OF FORCE STRUCTURES ARE THE SUBJECT OF PUBLIC DEBATE IN THE PARLIAMENTS AND IN THE MEDIA. ACCORDINGLY, THERE IS EXTENSIVE INFORMATION
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PUBLICLY AVAILABLE ABOUT THESE SUBJECTS AND IT IS VERY EASY TO SELECT SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENTS AND OVEREMPHASIZE AND DISTORT THEM IN VARIOUS CONTEXTS. IT IS KNOWN THAT BOTH SIDES CONTINUE TO MODERNIZE THEIR FORCES, THAT IS REPLACE OLD EQUIPMENT WITH NEW EQUIPMENT. IN THE EAST, THE QUANTITIES OF MANY MAJOR WEAPONS IN THE AREA HAVE CONTINUED TO INCREASE AND THERE APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN SOME MANPOWER INCREASES AS NEW TYPES OF UNITS HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED. IN THIS NEGOTIATION, THE WEST HAS CONSISTENTLY REFRAINED FROM COMMENT ON INCREASES AND IMPROVEMENTS IN EASTERN FORCES SINCE THIS TENDS TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE DIFFICULT ISSUES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE WEST, THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY INCREASE IN OVERALL MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA SINCE THE START OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO GET INTO ANY NUMBERS ON THESE POINTS. BUT YOU MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT THESE WESTERN ACTIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN RESPONSE TO THE BUILD UP OF WARSAW PACT FORCES.

IT IS EXCEEDINGLY IMPORTANT TO POINT OUT IN THIS

CONNECTION THAT FOR THE WEST, DEFENSE AND ARMS
CONTROL ATRATEGIES ARE COMPLEMENTARY. AND WITH
REGARD TO THE LATTER, WESTERN PROPOSALS IN THESE
NEGOTIATIONS -- INCLUDING THOSE IN THE NEW WESTERN
INITIATIVE -- PROVIDE A REALISTIC, EQUITABLE AND
PRACTICAL BASIS FOR REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS.
THE WEST HAS SHOWN FLEXIBILITY WHICH SHOULD BE
RECIPROCATED BY THE EAST WHICH HAS MADE NO PROPOSALS
TO CHANGE THE OUTCOME IT PROPOSES AT THE OUTSET OF
THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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